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as a matter of policy the extent to which they will protect condominium 
purchasers and then implement that policy through revisions of their 
condominium acts. 
Trademarks AECTION 44(d) OF THE LANHAM ACT - USE IN COM- 
MERCE BY THE FOREIGN APPLICANT AS A PREREQUISITE O SECURING A 
UNITED STATES TRADEMARK REGISTRATION -John Lecroy 6 Son, Znc. 
v .  Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F .  Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132 (D.D.C. 1974). 
During the past 25 years, patent tribunals have alternated between two 
conflicting positions as to the requirements for foreign applicants seeking 
United States trademark registrations. John Lecroy & Son, Inc. a. 
Langis Foods Ltd.' was hailed as an opportunity for a judicial tribunal to 
confront this administrative confusion squarely and settle the matter. 
Instead, the court chose to cast aside the alternatives offered by previous 
administrative decisions and to forge a third position. Thus, the con- 
clusion of the court, rather than dousing the fires of confusion, has only 
served to fuel them. 
Langis Foods Limited (Langis), a Canadian corporation, filed applica- 
tion in Canada on March 28, 1969, to register the trademark "Lemon 
Tree."2 At this time Langis had not used this mark in either Canada or 
the United States.3 By September 19, 1969, the date it filed application 
for registration of Lemon Tree in the United States, Langis had begun 
using the mark in Canada. As Langis had still not used the mark in the 
United States, it stated a claim of priority under section 44(d) of the 
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)4 which would have given Langis 
an effective application date of March 28, 1969, the filing date of its 
Canadian application. 
During the interval between Langis' Canadian and United States 
filing dates, John Lecroy & Son, Inc. (Lecroy), a United States corpora- 
tion, commenced using the trademark Lemon Tree in the United States, 
'John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F. Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 192,64 TRADE- 
MARK REP. 301 (D.D.C. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom. SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., NO. 
74-1841, D. C. Cir., August 26, 1974. 
2The trademark "Lemon Tree" is for use in conjuction with dry crystals which when mixed 
with water create lemonade. Id .  at 964, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 133,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 302. 
sunlike the law in the United States, Canadian law permits an applicant to file for registra- 
tion of a "proposed trademark before the mark has actually been used. However, registra- 
tion is granted only if use of the trademark is commenced within 6 months of the date of the 
intial filing. In fact, of the more than 70 nations subscribing to the International Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, no more than 
three require use prior to the filing of an application. John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods 
Ltd., 177 U.S.P.Q. 717, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 308 (T.T.A.B. 1973), vacated, 376 F. Supp. 
962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132,64 TRADE-MARK EP. 301 (D.D.C. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom.  SCM 
Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., No. 74-1841, D.C. Cir., August 26, 1974. 
4Lanham Act 5 44(d), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(d) (1970). 
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and, on June 18, 1969, filed its application with the United States Patent 
Office to register the mark. The Patent Office awarded registration of 
the mark to Langis. When Lecroy's petition to cancel this registration 
was denied by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,5 Lecroy made 
application to the District Court for the District of Columbia for review 
of the Board's decision. The court, in vacating the decision of the Trade- 
mark Trial and Appeal Board, held that, pursuant to section 2(d) of the 
Lanham Act6 which prohibits the registration of a mark previously used 
in the United States by another, Langis was not entitled to registration of 
the mark Lemon Tree.' 
Common law trademark rights, referred to collectively as the right to 
exclusive use of a mark within the territorial bounds of the merchant's 
commercial activity, arose when a mark came to symbolize the goodwill 
of the merchant or manufacturer in his product.* Since this goodwill 
developed by sale of goods in association with the mark,g a merchant 
established rights in a trademark by using the mark in trade.1° The date 
of first sale of the goods bearing the trademark became the date of first 
use of the mark.ll 
These common law trademark rights and rules for establishing such 
rights are preserved in section 1 of the Lanham Act.12 After common law 
5John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 177 U.S.P.Q. 717, 64 TRADE-MARK &P. 308 
(T.T.A.B. 1973), vacated, 376 F. Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132, 64 TRADE-MARK &P. 301 
(D.D.C. 1974), appeal docketed sub n o m .  SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., No. 74-1841, D.C. 
Cir., August 26, 1974. 
6Lanham Act 8 2(d), 15 U.S.C. 8 1052(d) (1970). 
7This case note will not deal with the conflicting claims of Lecroy and Langis in the marks 
"Apple Tree," "Orange Tree," and "Lime Tree." Lecroy's applications to register Apple Tree 
and Lime Tree were filed with the Patent Office on July 22, 1970, and Langis' applications to 
register the marks Apple Tree and Orange Tree were filed on September 19, 1969. In August, 
1971, the Patent Office published Langis' marks Apple Tree and Orange Tree in its "Official 
Gazette" for the purposes of opposition. In response Lecroy instituted oppositions to de- 
fendant's Apple Tree and Orange Tree. In its decision the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board dismissed Lecroy's oppositions to defendant's marks. The district court remanded 
Lecroy's oppositions to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board for further proceedings con- 
sistent with its treatment of the mark Lemon Tree. 
Also, this case note does not confront the situation of the foreign applicant who has failed 
to allege any use whatsoever. The case under examination presents only the problem of a 
foreign applicant who, while alleging use in his country of origin, has failed to allege use in 
the United States. 
SSee, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
9Zd. 
"-'See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916). 
"See, e.g., West Disinfecting Co. v. Onorato, 113 U.S.P.Q. 200, 47 TRADE-MARK &P. 782 
(C.C.P.A. 1957); Coahoma Chemical Co. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. 413,47 TRADE-MARK 'REP. 1135 
(Comm'r 1957). 
12Lanhan Act 8 1,15 U.S.C. 8 1051 (1970). 
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rights in a trademark have been created by use in trade, a person may 
create additional rights in a trademark under section 1, via federal regis- 
tration of the mark. One of these valuable statutory rights is that regis- 
tration is prima facie evidence of the right to exclusive use of the mark.l3 
After 5 years of use the owner's rights in the registered mark become in- 
contestable, the certificate of registration serving as conclusive evidence 
of ownership and the right to exclusive use of the mark.14 
In order to qualify for these statutory rights, the Lanham Act requires 
use of the mark in commence which Congress may lawfully control.l5 
Therefore, to successfully register a mark under the Lanham Act, two 
different uses must be established: the "use" which ties the mark to the 
product, thus creating common law rights, and the "use in [interstate] 
commerce" which makes the trademark eligible for federal registration.l6 
Foreign merchants have always been able to file applications in the 
United States for trademarks by complying with the above prescribed 
requirements.'? In addition, foreign applicants have other avenues 
available for filing United States trademark applications under the Inter- 
national Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris 
Union Treaty).lg The basic tenet of the Paris Union Treaty is that the 
same rights and advantages that are available to citizens of one signatory 
country shall be equally available to foreign nationals from other signa- 
tory countries. These rights are to be extended without prejudice to the 
rights specially provided in the Treaty itself.lg 
One of the alternative courses the foreign applicant can pursue in fil- 
ing the United States application is set forth in article 4 of the Treaty.20 
13Lanham Act Q 33(a), 15 U.S.C. Q 11 15(a) (1970). 
'4Lanham Act 5 33(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 11 15(b) (1970). 
l5Lanham Act 5 1, 15 U.S.C. Q 1051 (1970). Transportation in commerce of the goods that 
bear the mark is sufficient to meet the registration requirement of "use in commerce." See, 
e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 102 U.S.P.Q. 449,45 TRADE-MARK EP. 
330 (Comm'r 1954). 
16Zelnick, Foreign Trademark Applicants and Registrants and the Requirement of Use: 
T h e  Right to  Register, 52 TRADE-MARK EP. 64 1,643 (1 962) [hereinafter cited as Zelnick] . 
170ffner, Requirements for Filing Trademark Applications by Foreigners in the United 
States of America, 55 TRADE-MARK EP. 1074 (1965). 
ls [1962] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. 
l91d. at 26. Article 2 of the Paris Union Treaty reads, in part, as follows: 
(1) Nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards the protection 
of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that 
their respective laws now grant, or may hereinafter grant, to nationals, without pre- 
judice to the rights specially provided by the present convention. 
20Zd. at 27-29. Article 4 of the Paris Union Treaty provides, in part, as follows: 
A. - (1) A person who has duly filed an application . . . for the registration of a .  . . 
trademark, in one of the countries of the Union, or his successors in title, shall enjoy, 
for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods 
hereinafter stated. 
(2) Every filing that is equivalent to a regular national filing under the domestic law 
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It provides that the foreign applicant of a country adhering to the Paris 
Union Treaty is entitled to a right of priority - a filing date equal to his 
filing date in his country of origin - if he files an application in any 
other country participating in the Treaty within 6 months from the date 
on which the application was first filed in the country of origin.21 This 
right of priority cannot be invalidated by any intervening act. Whether 
it be another filing or even use of the mark itself, such acts cannot give 
rise to any right of third parties.22 
In the United States, section 44(d) of the Lanham Act is the statutory 
restatement of the article 4 priority pro~ision.~3 Section 44(d) grants 
priority to the foreign applicant who has previously filed an application 
for registration of the same mark in one of the countries of the Union if 
two conditions are met. First, the application must be filed within 6 
months of the date on which the application was filed in the foreign 
country. Second, the United States application must conform as nearly 
as practicable to the requirements of the Lanham Act, though use in com- 
merce need not be alleged.24 
of any country of the Union or under bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded be- 
tween countries of the Union shall be recognized as giving rise to the right of priority. 
(3) By a regular national filing is meant any filing that is adequate to establish the date 
on which the application was filed. . . whatever may be the outcome of the application. 
B. - Consequently, the subsequent filing in any of the other countries of the Union 
before the expiration of those periods shall not be invalidated through any acts accom- 
plished in the interval, as, for instance, by another filing. . .or  by use of the mark, and 
these acts cannot give rise to any right of third parties, or of any personal possession. 
C. - (1) The above-mentioned periods of priority shall be. . . six months for. . . 
trademarks. 
D. - (1) Any person desiring to take advantage of the priority of a previous filing 
shall be required to make a declaration indicating the date of such filing and the 
country in which it was made. Each country will determine the latest permissible date 
for making such declaration. 
21Zd. at 27. 
22Zd. 
2%. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1946). Section 44(d) of the Lanham Act is set 
forth, in part, at note 24 infra. Article 4 of the Paris Union Treaty is set forth, in part, at 
note 20 supra. 
24Lanham Act $44(d), 15 U.S.C. $ 1126(d) (1970). This section reads, in part, as follows: 
(d) An application for registration of a mark under sections 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054 or 
1091 of this title, filed by a person described in subsection (b) of this section who has 
previously duly filed an application for registration of the same mark in one of the 
countries described in subsection (b) of this section shall be accorded the same force and 
effect as would be accorded to the same application if filed in the United States on the 
same date on which the application was first filed in such foreign country: Provided, 
That - 
(1) the application in the United States is filed within six months from the date 
on which the application was first filed in the foreign country; 
(2) the application conforms as nearly as practicable to the requirements of this 
chapter, but use in commerce need not be alleged; 
(3) the rights acquired by third parties before the date of the filing of the first 
application in the foreing [sic] country shall in no way be affected by a registration 
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Administrative interpretation of the requirements of foreign applica- 
tions under section 44 has undergone radical alterations. The Commis- 
sioner of Patents gave the first authoritative interpretation of the require- 
ments under this section in British Insulated Callender's Cables Ltd.25 
A British merchant had filed a United States application based on a 
registration in Great Britain. No use had been made of the trademark 
anywhere by the British applicant, and therefore specimens could not be 
filed as ordinarily required of United States applicants.26 Petitioning 
the court to withdraw the specimen requirement, the British applicant 
relied on section 44(e) of the Lanham Act which provides, in part, as 
follows: "A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign 
applicant may be registered on the principal register if eligible . . . ."27 
The Commissioner focused, however, on section 44(c) of the Lanham 
Act which declares that no registration of a mark in the United States 
shall be granted a foreign applicant until that mark has been registered 
in the country of origin of the applicant, unless use in commerce is 
alleged.28 From his examination of section 44(c), the Commissioner con- 
cluded that section 44(e) did not eliminate for the foreign applicant any 
of the requisites for registration except the requirement to allege use in 
c0mmerce.~9 The Commissioner concluded that an allegation of use 
"somewhere," most commonly in the foreign applicant's country of 
origin, was required. As the British merchant had made no allegation of 
use whatsoever, its application was deemed incomplete and was not ac- 
cepted for examination.30 
Societe Fromageries Bel,31 the so-called Merry Cow ~ a s e , 3 ~  expressly 
overruled Insulated Callender's.33 Merry Cow reasoned that the pro- 
visions of the Paris Union Treaty obligated the United States to elimi- 
nate for the foreign applicant applying under section 44 of the Lanham 
obtained on an application filed under this subsection; 
(4) nothing in this subsection shall entitle the owner of a registration granted 
under this section to sue for acts committed prior to the date on which his mark was 
registered in this country unless the registration is based on use in commerce. 
2583 U.S.P.Q. 319,39 TRADE-MARK EP. 1057 (Comm'r 1949). 
26Id. 
27Lanham Act 5 44(e), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(e) (1970). 
28Lanham Act 5 44(c), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(c) (1970). This section reads, in part, as follows: 
( c )  No registration of a mark in the United States by a person described in subsection 
(b) of this section shall be granted until such mark has been registered in the country of 
origin of the applicant, unless the applicant alleges use in commerce. 
2983 U.S.P.Q. at 320, 39 TRADE-MARK REP. at 1058. 
30Id. 
Z1105 U.S.P.Q. 392,45 TRADE-MARK EP. 846 (Comm'r 1955). 
32Societe Fromageries Be1 is known as the Merry Cow case as it involved a trademark com- 
prising a design illustration of the head of a laughing cow subscribed with the words "The 
Merry Cow." Id. at 393,45 TRADE-MARK REP. at 847. 
33Zd. at 398.45 TRADE-MARK EP. at 855. 
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Act not just the requirement of use in United States commerce, but any 
requirement of use whatsoever. The Commissioner based his holding on 
the provisions of article 6 of the Treaty which provide that trademarks 
properly registered in the country of origin shall be admitted for regis- 
tration in the form originally registered.34 In summarizing his analysis 
of article 6, the Commissioner observed: 
Reduced to its simplest form, Article 6 merely means that when regis- 
tration of a mark has issued in an applicant's home country ("country of 
origin") in accordance with the law of that country, the United States 
Patent Office will, upon receipt of a properly executed application, a 
copy of the home registration, a drawing of the mark, and the filing fee, 
accept the foreign registration at face value and issue a registration in the 
United States . . . .35 
Seven years after the Merry Cow decision, the Patent Office published 
a change in rule 2.39 of the Rules of Practice in trademark cases. The 
amended rule 2.39 explicitly permitted omissions of "use in commerce" 
allegations by foreign applicants under section 44 of the Lanham Act.S6 
The question remained, however, whether applications which alleged no 
use whatsoever would continue to be accepted under Merry Cow.S7 
This question was answered in Certain Incomplete Trademark Appli- 
cations38 where the Commissioner adopted the position of Insulated Cal- 
lender's, holding that foreign applicants relying on their home registra- 
tion must allege use somewhere and file specimens of the mark used.39 
34 [1962] 1 U.S.T. 34, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. Article 6 of the Paris Union Treaty reads, in part, 
as follows: 
A. - (1) Every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be accepted 
for filing and protected in its original form in the other countries of the Union, subject 
to the reservations indicated in the present Article. . . . 
. . . .  
B. - Trademarks under the present Article may not be denied registration or invali- 
dated except in the following cases: 
1 .  when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in 
the country where protection is claimed; 
2. when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consist exclusively of signs or 
indications which may serve in trade to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended 
purpose, value, place of origin of the goods or time of production, or have become 
customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices 
of the trade of the country where protection is claimed; 
3. when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such a 
nature as to deceive the public. It is understood that a mark may not be considered 
contrary to public order for the sole reason that it does not conform to a provision of 
the law relating to trademarks, except where such provision itself relates to public 
order. 
35105 U.S.P.Q. at 398,45 TRADE-MARK EP. at 854. 
3637 C.F.R. 9 2.39 (1974). 
3'John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F. Supp. at 966, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 134,64 
TRADE-MARK EP. at 304-05. 
38137 U.S.P.Q. 69,53 TRADE-MARK EP. 577 (Comm'r 1963). 
39Zd. at 76-77, 53 TRADE-MARK REP. at 585-87. Reviewing article 6, which served as the 
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The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decided the precursor of the 
instant case on May 7, 1973, in favor of the Canadian applicant, Langk40 
By its decision, the Board reverted, in a short and confusing opinion,41 
to the Merry Cow decision which declared that a foreign applicant under 
section 44 of the Lanham Act need not allege use in commerce, nor any 
use what~oever.4~ 
In reviewing the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's decision, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia examined articles 2, 4, and 
foundation of the holding in Merry Cow, the Commissioner pointed out that the applicable 
provisions of article 6 deal only with the trademark itself, that is, the words and symbols 
which constitute the mark. Id. at 72, 53 TRADE-MARK EP. at 580. By analyzing the orignial 
Convention proceedings, the Commissioner became convinced that the article stood only for 
the following proposition: 
[I] f a trademark has already been registered in one country, then a second country in 
which registration is sought cannot object to the mark itself with respect to its nature, 
except on the grounds specified in paragraph B. 
Id. 
The Commissioner buttressed his conviction by noting that in Lisbon, in 1958, a new 
provision had been inserted as a preface to article 6 which reads, in part, as follows: 
"(1) The conditions for the filing and registration of trademarks shall be determined in 
each country of the Union by its domestic law." [I9621 1 U.S.T. 31, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. From 
this provision, the Commissioner concluded that article 6 never did and does not now control 
the conditions and formalities required by a country for obtaining a registration. 137 U.S.P.Q. 
at 72,53 TRADE-MARK EP. at 580. 
40177 U.S.P.Q. 717,64 TRADE-MARK EP. 308. 
41Part of the confusion stemmed from the Board's apparent misunderstanding of the facts 
of the case before it. The Board stated that the Canadian applicant, Langis, had not alleged 
use at the time of the filing of its Canadian application, or even by the time the United States 
application was filed. Id. at 718, 64 TRADE-MARK REP at 309; 376 F. Supp. at 964 n.1, 
182 U.S.P.Q. at 133 n.1, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. at 302 n.1. However, it appears the mark 
was alleged to have been in use in Canada prior to the filing of the United States application. 
Derenberg, The  Myth of the Proposed International Trademark "Registration" Treaty ( T R T ) ,  
63 TRADE-MARK EP. 531, 545 n.52 [hereinafter cited as Derenberg]. Indeed, the United 
States application included specimens of the mark as the mark had been used. It was pre- 
cisely the allegation of use and the inclusion of specimens that permitted Langis' application 
to be processed normally. Id. Inasmuch as the United States application did include foreign 
use allegations and specimens, this was not the proper case to discuss Incomplete Trademark 
Applications, let alone overrule it. Id. 
42Some members of the United States trademark profession intimate that the Board's deci- 
sion was inspired by the Trademark Registration Treaty (TRT) which permits the initial 
registration of totally unused marks. The Trademark Registration Treaty has not yet been 
ratified by the United States and is opposed by some of its largest and most prestigious pro- 
fessional groups, including the New York Patent Law Association and the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York. Derenberg, supra note 41, at 546. 
At the center of the Trademark Registration Treaty is a provision for a single international 
filing of trademark applications. All fees for the registrations would be paid to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva. After the international registration is issued, 
each participating nation would apply its own substantive laws. Arguments for and against 
T R T  are set forth in brief in 43 U.S.L.W. 2087. The Trademark Registration Treaty is ex- 
plored in depth by a series of articles in 63 TRADE-MARK EP. 218 (1973). 
3081 CASE NOTES 315 
6 of the Paris Union Treaty which formed the foundation of Langis' 
argument that: 
[W] here a foreign applicant applies for registration of a mark not pre- 
viously used in commerce in the United States, but which is subject of an 
application for registration in a foreign country, the Treaty auto- 
matically awards such applicant a use date in the United States of the 
date of the foreign 
The court began its analysis with article 2, noting that it provided no 
basis for granting superior substantive rights to foreign applicants.44 
The only requirement of this article, the court declared, is "that the same 
rights and advantages available to citizens of one signatory country be 
equally available to foreign nationals from other signatory c0untries."~5 
The court, in dismissing any support for the Board's decision based on 
article 6 of the Convention, merely referred to the Commissioner's "sub- 
stantial and scholarly analysis," of the meaning and purpose of that 
article as found in Incomplete Trademark Appl i~a t ions .~6  The court 
agreed that article 6 does not control the conditions required by a 
country for obtaining a registration, but only eliminates objections to 
trademarks because of the inherent nature or form of the mark it~elf.~7 
The court dealt tersely with article 4 of the Convention, upon which 
Langis also relied. The court observed that this article relates only to the 
procedural right of priority for applications based on a previously filed 
foreign application. The court concluded "There is nothing in article 
4 concerned with the requirements necessary for regi~tration."~s 
The court concluded by instructing foreign and domestic applicants 
how to obtain rights in a trademark in the United States. The court de- 
clared, " [PI rior right in a trademark in the United States depends on 
priority of use in the United States and is not affected by priority of use in 
a foreign country."49 With this instruction the court went beyond the 
requirements set forth in Insulated Callender's and Incomplete Trade- 
mark Applications and declared insufficient their requirement of use 
"somewhere. " Without the required "use in commerce" the foreign 
applicant is not eligible for a United States trademark registration.50 
-- - -  
43376 F. Supp. at 965, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 133,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 303. 
44Zd., 182 U.S.P.Q. at 134,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 304. 
45Zd. 
46Zd. at 966, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 134,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 305. 
4'Zd. 
48Zd. 
49Zd. at 967, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 135, 64 TRADE-MARK KEP. at 307. The court, in support of this 
view, cites two recent cases, Sterling Drug Inc. v. Kroll A.-G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q. 
628 (T.T.A.B. 1968) and Cooper's, Inc. v. Jockey Shoe Polish, Inc., 149 U.S.P.Q. 704 (T.T.A.B. 
1966). Both cases confront the issue of priority rights for foreign applicants superficially and 
add little, if anything, to the analysis conducted in the instant case. 
50376 F. Supp. at 967,182 U.S.P.Q. at 135,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 307. 
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As Langis presented no testimony of "use in commerce," the court 
restricted Langis to its filing date in the United States.s1 Noting that 
Lecroy's use in commerce was prior to Langis' United States filing date, 
the court held that Langis was not entitled to registration of the mark 
Lemon Tree.S2 
Prior to Lecroy, cases like Insulated Cal lender's and Incomplete 
Trademark Applications attempted to preserve the common law notion 
that trademark rights arise from use in trade. Both cases seem to say that 
use must be alleged in the United States applications but that the use 
need not be in the United States. The common law, however, declares 
that use in the foreign applicant's home country is only sufficient to 
create rights in that country. Trademark rights are territorial rights, 
and use abroad creates no right to a mark in the United States. T o  allow 
use in a foreign country to create rights in the United States is a signifi- 
cant departure from the common law, a departure that approaches a re- 
jection of use requirements for foreigners entirely, the "ill" Insulated 
Callender's and Incomplete Trademark Applications were apparently 
designed to cure.53 
The district court's decision in Lecroy is significant as it re-equates ter- 
ritorial rights with territorial use. Lecroy demands that because the 
benefits created by the Lanham Act are completely internal to the United 
States, the use that must be alleged by a foreign applicant is use of the 
trademark in commerce which Congress may lawfully regulate. The 
court declares, "Use of a trademark outside the United States, therefore, 
does not establish or create rights which can be asserted in an inter partes 
proceeding. "54 
The weakness with this decision is that it is at odds with the demands 
of the Paris Union Treaty and section 44(d) of the Lanham Act. Section 
44(d) of the Lanham Act is grounded upon article 4 of the Paris Union 
Treaty. Article 4 grants a right of priority to a person who has filed a 
trademark application in one of the countries of the Union for the pur- 
pose of filing in other countries, so long as the subsequent filing is made 
before the expiration of the 6-month priority period.55 This article also 
- - -- 
5lZd. at 968, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 135,64 TRADE-MARK &P. at 307. 
52Zd. at 968, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 135,64 TRADE-MARK &P. at 307-08. 
53Zelnick, supra note 16, at 650. 
54376 F. Supp. at 967, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 135, 64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 307. Lecroy became the 
first case in which the Treaty priority provisions were examined in the context of an inter partes 
proceeding, i.e., opposition and cancellation. No distinction was or should have been drawn 
in this regard between ex parte and inter partes proceedings. Derenberg, supra note 41, at 547. 
55 [1962] 1 U.S.T. 27-28, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. Article 4 of the Paris Union Treaty is set forth, 
in part, at note 20 supra. 
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specifies that acts occurring after the priority date cannot invalidate the 
foreign applicant's right of priority in the country of second filing to 
register his mark.56 
Section 44 of the Lanham Act, drafted to give effect to article 4 of the 
Treaty, restricts the rights of third parties to those acquired "before the 
date of the filing of the first application in the foreign country."57 The  
federal statute is, therefore, consistent with the Treaty in providing that 
acts by third parties after that date cannot restrict the foreign applicant's 
right to registration of his mark if the filing by the foreign applicant is 
made within the 6-month priority period. Section 44(d) of the Lanham 
Act and the Paris Union Treaty combine to create in foreign owners who 
may never have used the mark in the United States a substantive right to 
obtain a registered trademark with priority rights over third parties who 
have intervened during the limited period. 
The language of section 44(d)(4) of the Lanham Act provides a further 
argument against the court's position that all registration applications 
must include an allegation of "use in commerce."58 Subsection (d) of 
section 44 declares, in part: 
(4) nothing in this subsection shall entitle the owner of a registration 
granted under this section to sue for acts committed prior to the date on 
which his mark was registered in this country unless the registration is 
based on use in commerce.59 
Simply, section 44 must provide another method for foreign applicants 
to secure a United States trademark registration. Otherwise there would 
be no purpose to subsection (d)(4) because the express exception included 
therein, "unless the registration is based on use in commerce," would 
include all cases and would swallow the rule. The "exception" incor- 
porated in the rule of subsection (d)(4), however, is not useless. Proper- 
ly interpreted, section 44(d) of the Lanham Act provides a second avenue 
to obtain a United States trademark registration that does not require an 
allegation of "use in commerce. "60 
56Zd. 
57Lanham Act 8 44(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1126(d) (1970). This section is set forth, in part, at note 
24 supra. 
58Subsection (c) of 5 44 of the Lanham Act, set forth, in part, at note 28 supra, could be used 
to construct a similar argument. 
59Lanham Act § 44(d), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(d) (1970). This section is set forth, in part, at note 
24 supra. 
6oStatements made in numerous hearings before congressional committees considering the 
Lanham Act further substantiate the proposition that a foreign applicant may secure a United 
States trademark without alleging "use in commerce." 
An excerpt from Hearings on H.R. 4744 Bejore the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House 
Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1939) reads as follows: 
Mr. Rogers. . . . There are two kinds of registration permitted foreigners. If a foreigner 
uses a mark in this country, he is entitled to register on the basis of use. If he has not 
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Article 2 of the Paris Union Treaty is not contrary to the provisions 
of article 4 and section 44(d) of the Lanham Act. While article 2 provides 
that " [n] ationals of each of the countries of the Union shall . . . enjoy in 
all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective 
laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals," this is to be done 
"without prejudice to the rights specially provided by the present Con- 
vention."6l Thus, when the instant court declares that the only require- 
ment of this article is that the same rights and advantages available to 
nationals shall be equally available to foreign nationals, the court is clos- 
ing its eyes for the sake of its argument to the mandate that there are 
rights specially provided by the Treaty that are not to be prejudiced. 
One of these rights is the priority right of article 4 which is extended to all 
foreign applicants who properly apply and qualify under the priority 
provisions of section 44(d) of the Lanham Act. 
A definitive examination of the provisions of article 6 of the Paris 
Union Treaty was conducted in Incomplete Trademark Applications. 
There the Commissioner pointed out that article 6 deals only with the 
trademark itselt that is, the words and symbols which constitute the 
mark. It should be emphasized that article 6 does not in any fashion 
modify the priority provisions of article 4. Article 6 merely directs any 
inquiry as to the requirements for the filing and registration of trade- 
marks in a country that is a party to the Treaty to that country's domestic 
law.62 
Under the facts of the Lecroy case, section 44(d) of the Lanham Act is 
the domestic law that sets forth applicable conditions for the filing and 
registration of trademarks. Langis who previously duly filed an applica- 
tion for registration of the mark Lemon Tree in Canada, applied for 
registration of the same mark in the United States. The application was 
filed in the United States within 6 months from the date on which the 
application was first filed in Canada; this satisfied the first of two require- 
ments set forth in subsection (d).63 
used it in this country, then he is entitled to registration under the convention, which 
does not require use here. 
The same view is expressed in the following exchange from Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a 
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1944): 
Mr. Frazer. . . . A foreign applicant for registration who presents his home registration 
does not have to use the mark in the United States and has not had to since the act of 
1905. 
Senator Pepper. Is there any reason why he should have the right to register his mark 
without showing use? 
Mr. Frazer. Nothing except the convention. 
61 [1962] 1 U.S.T. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. Article 2 of the Paris Union Treaty is set forth, in 
part, at note 19 supra. 
62 [1962] 1 U.S.T. 31, T.I.A.S. No. 4931. The preface to article 6 of the Paris Union Treaty 
is set forth, in part, at note 39 supra. 
63Lanham Act 9 44(d), 15 U.S.C. 9 1126(d) (1970). This section is set forth, in part, at note 
24 supra. 
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The second requisite demands that Langis' application conform as 
nearly as practicable to the requirements of the Lanham Act, but "use in 
commerce" need not be alleged.64 Thus, a foreign applicant is required 
to comply with all but one of the requirements of section 1 of the Lanham 
Act. Section 1 provides that a verified written application must be filed 
specifying, inter alia, "the date of applicant's first use of the mark, the 
date of applicant's first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connec- 
tion with which the mark is used, and the mode or manner in which the 
mark is used in connection with the goods."65 
Langis complied with each of the foregoing conditions, except Langis 
did not specify the date of its first use of the mark in commerce.66 It was 
due to the absence of this allegation that the district court found Langis' 
application fatally deficient.67 It is clear, however, that in doing so the 
court ignored precise statutory language on this point. The statute de- 
clares that "use in commerce need not be alleged."68 Langis was not re- 
quired to assert such use, and the district court erred in holding contrari- 
wise.69 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because Langis satisfied the requirements of section 44(d), its United 
States application should have been accorded "the same force and effect 
as would be accorded to the same application if filed in the United States 
on the same date on which the application was first filed in such foreign 
country."70 Lecroy was entitled to no use date prior to Langis' Canadian 
filing date. Therefore, the mark Lemon Tree should have been regis- 
tered to Lang i~ .~ l  
64Zd. 
65Lanham Act 5 1,15 U.S.C. 5 1051 (1970;. 
66376 F. Supp. at 968, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 135,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 307. 
67Zd. 
68Lanham Act 544(d), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(d) (1970). This section is set forth, in part, at note 
24 supra. 
69The Commissioner of Patents filed a memorandum in support of the motion for recon- 
sideration of the Lecroy opinion. Therein the Commissioner argued strongly against requir- 
ing Langis to allege "use in commerce." The Commissioner wrote: 
The  Commissioner appreciates the fact that in the opinion filed May 29, 1974, the 
Court concludes use in the United States is required. However, if this be so in every case 
where priority is claimed, why would Congress provide in 5 1126(d)(2) that "use in com- 
merce need not be alleged"? The Court's answer, respectfully, seems to be that Section 1 
of the Act (15 U.S.C. 5 1051) requires every registration of a trademark to be based on use 
of the trademark. If use were required in every instance, it would appear that Congress 
was performing an exercise in futility in providing "use in commerce need not be alleged" 
in 5 1126(d)(2). 
70Lanham Act 5 44(d), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(d) (1970). This section is set forth, in part, at note 
24 supra. 
71Under article 5C(1) of the Paris Union Treaty, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 30, T.I.A.S. NO. 4931, 
Langis would then have a reasonable period to begin use of the mark in the United States be- 
fore the registration could be cancelled. Article 5C(1) states as follows: 
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The  House and Senate Committee Reports which accompanied 
House Resolution 1654, which became the Trademark Act of 1946, read 
in part: 
Industrialists in this country have been seriously handicapped in 
securing protection in foreign countries due to our failure to carry out, 
by statute, our international obligations. . . . T o  remedy this discredit- 
able situation is merely an act of international good faith. 
This bill attempts to accomplish these various things: 
. . . .  
2. T o  carry out by statute our international commitments to the end 
that American traders in foreign countries may secure the protection to 
their marks to which they are entitled.72 
The court has disregarded plain statutory language in demanding the 
allegation of "use in commerce" by a foreign applicant claiming the 
priority benefits of section 44(d) of the Lanham Act. As a result, indus- 
trialists in this country may once again be seriously handicapped in secur- 
ing protection in foreign countries. This time, however, failure to carry 
out our international obligations will not lie for want of suitable statu- 
tory expression, rather failure will rest with the courts. T o  remedy this 
discreditable situation is merely an act of international good faith.73 
If, in any country, the use of a registered trademark is compulsory, the registration 
shall not be cancelled until after a reasonable period, and then only if the person con- 
cerned cannot justify his inaction. 
72S. REP. NO. 1333, supra note 23. 
73It appears that any failure to honor Paris Union Treaty commitments will not rest with 
the District Court for Eastern North Carolina. In American Petrofina, Inc. v. Brown, Civil 
No. 1329, - F. Supp. - (E.D.N.C. 1974), rendered September 12, 1974, Judge Dupree of that 
court declared that the owner of a trademark registered in a foreign country can obtain 
registration of the mark in the United States under the provisions of the Paris Union Treaty 
without prior use in United States commerce. 
Plaintiff was engaged in international trade using the tradename "Petrofina" and the trade- 
mark "FINA" when that mark was registered in Canada. Petrofina then used its Canadian 
registration as a basis for an application for registration in the United States in 1954. Plaintiffs 
United States registration was issued in January 1956, and Petrofina began using the mark in 
the United States in October 1956. Meanwhile, Brown initiated its use of the mark FINA in 
the United States in August 1956. 
The court, in granting judgment as a matter of law to Petrofina, rejected Brown's argument 
that Lecroy required a finding in defendant's favor. The  court found it "difficult to reconcile 
Judge Hart's ruling [in Lecroy] with the provisions of 15 U.S.C. Section 1126(d)." 
